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On  a  naive  view  of  conceptual  engineering,  conceptual  engineers
simply aim at  engineering concepts.  This picture has recently come
under  attack.  Sarah  Sawyer  (2018,  2020)  and  Derek  Ball  (2020)
present  two  rather  different,  yet  equally  unorthodox,  accounts  of
conceptual engineering, which they take to be superior to the naive
picture. This paper casts doubts on the superiority of their respective
accounts. By elaborating on the explanatory potential of “going meta”,
the paper defends the naive view against Sawyer’s and Ball’s  rival
proposals.
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I. Introduction
Names can be misleading. Just look at the species named “red panda”: not all red
pandas have red(dish) fur and, surprisingly, not a single member of this species is
a  panda.  (At  least  they  live  up  to  their  name by mainly  feeding on bamboo,
though.) A lot of singular terms are like “red panda”, and even names for philo-
sophical projects are not to be trusted. Take the term “conceptual engineering” as
an example. Some philosophers consider this term a misnomer of the kind “red
panda”. If they are correct, conceptual engineering has nothing (or only surpris-
ingly little) to do with  concepts or their  engineering, but rather has more to do
with e.g. linguistic meanings or the right analyses of concepts.
Before we consider two such positions in more detail, let us look at a naive pic-
ture of conceptual engineering first. On this picture, the term “conceptual engin-
eering” is considered a connotative term, as Millians would put it; i.e. the term is
taken as referring to an activity or process of engineering concepts. According to
the naive view, conceptual engineers are concerned with assessing our conceptual
repertoire. And they are considered as trying to improve the concepts we are cur-
rently employing by either revising or replacing them with concepts they see as a
better choice.1 Thus understood, conceptual engineering often leads to situations
1 This paper sides with neither the revisionist nor the replacement camp; see e.g. Scharp (2020,
405-7) on the distinction between the two options.  For ease of exposition, though, the paper
sometimes talks as if it favours the replacement option.
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of conceptual pluralism. The reason is simple: engineers aim at the replacement of
a concept c* by a (slightly) different and in their opinion somehow better concept
c. But since changing a language takes some time, engineering concepts often en-
genders situations in which speakers within a single linguistic community express
slightly different concepts with one and the same expression e. While some speak-
ers simply continue using  e  to express  c*  (i.e. the so far established concept),
other speakers have already started to use e to express the ameliorated c.2 As a res-
ult, the pre-engineering concept c* as well as the post-engineering c are simultan-
eously part of the community’s conceptual inventory during processes of amelior-
ation.
Take the word “marriage” as an example. There not only seem to be convincing
moral reasons for speakers of our linguistic community to express an inclusive
concept m with “marriage”, i.e. a concept which also includes marriages between
same-sex couples in its extension. But, of course, same-sex marriage is also leg-
ally recognised in various countries, including the US and the UK. Yet, apparently
many speakers stubbornly refuse to accept this. Despite the legal situation in their
countries, they use the English word “marriage” narrowly, referring to marriages
between men and women only. In other words: they employ an exclusive concept
of  marriage  m*.  We therefore (still)  find two competing concepts of  marriage
within a single linguistic community,  m and  m*, both expressed by one and the
same term “marriage”. 
In some contexts of dispute, such pluralism might make things particularly tricky.
For instance, consider the following exchange between a proponent and an oppon-
ent of same-sex marriage:
Opponent Olivia: “Marriage is a relation between men and women only.”
Proponent Paul: “I disagree. Marriage isn’t a relation between men and
women only.”
In a situation of two competing concepts of marriage, disputes like this raise ques-
tions about disagreement and topic continuity.3 Assume Olivia and Paul are using
2 Speakers  might  also use  e with  a  deliberately incorrect  meaning  to  foster  the  intended
conceptual change. As Sterken (2020) argues, intentionally misusing an expression might lead
to serious communicative disruptions. As these disruptions could often be transformative for
the audience, though, misusing e could provide a promising strategy for conceptual engineers
to implement the conceptual change they are striving for, or so Sterken would argue.
3 The problem of topic continuity goes back to Peter  Strawson’s  (1963) critique of Carnap
(1950).  It  is  tackled  by  e.g.  Cappelen  (2018,  2020),  Prinzing  (2018),  Nado  (2019)  and
Thomasson  (2020)  in  the  recent  literature.  See  also  Knoll’s  (2020)  discussion  of  topic
2
“marriage” divergently and are thus employing m*, i.e. the narrow, pre-engineer-
ing concept of marriage, and m, the more inclusive post-engineering concept re-
spectively. Are Olivia and Paul still disputing about the same topic? Do they only
present the appearance of disagreement while merely talking past each other?4 Or
are Olivia and Paul genuinely disagreeing – and if they are, what exactly is it they
are disagreeing about? “Marriage”, marriage or marriage*?
Only recently, questions like these have prompted philosophers to challenge the
naive picture of  conceptual  engineering and pluralism outlined.  It  is  two such
challenges to this picture that the present paper will focus on. In particular, Sarah
Sawyer’s (2018, 2020) and Derek Ball’s (2020) most recent contenders to the na-
ive view will  be critically discussed.  Both Sawyer and Ball  consider the term
“conceptual engineering” at least partly along the lines of terms like “red panda”.
According to Sawyer’s dual-aspect theory of representation, the linguistic mean-
ing a non-indexical term such as “marriage”  has is to be distinguished from the
concept this term expresses. And while conceptual engineers may succeed in alter-
ing the meanings of such terms, the concept expressed by these terms remains the
same throughout processes of amelioration. In Sawyer’s view, there is thus some
engineering going on in conceptual engineering but no engineering of  concepts.
Ball, in contrast, sticks to current orthodoxy in equating meanings with concepts.
On his account, however, conceptual engineers, if successful, only determine the
meanings/concepts of contested terms by advocating revisionary analyses of these
meanings/concepts.  This  way,  conceptual  engineers  do  not  really  engineer –
change or replace – concepts. But their arguments, if successful, “only” determine
which concepts we are (and have been) using all along. 
Motivating their contenders to the naive picture, Sawyer and Ball are both draw-
ing on analyses of disputes like Olivia’s and Paul’s. According to Sawyer and
Ball, to properly explain what is going on in such disputes, we can’t just rely on
the naive idea of pre- and post-ameliorators employing competing concepts. This
continuity and merely verbal disputes.
4 I follow e.g. Jenkins (2014), Balcerak Jackson (2014), Vermeulen (2018) and Belleri (2018) in
assuming that merely verbal disputes are characterised by two general conditions: if speakers
are merely talking past each other, (i) there is no relevant disagreement between them, but (ii)
they are simply using a key expression of their dispute differently (i.e. with different speakers’
meaning). Here “disagree(ment)” is used to refer to states and not activities (see Cappelen and
Hawthorne (2009, 60-1) or MacFarlane (2014, 119-20) regarding this distinction). The term is
used along the lines of MacFarlane’s notion of noncotenability with regard to attitudes of full
beliefs (also see fn. 10). Disputes, in contrast, are to be understood in purely behavioural terms
(Jenkins  2014,  13;  Vermeulen  2018,  333).  On the  distinction  between  merely  verbal  and
verbal disputes (i.e. metalinguistic negotiations), see below.
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paper critically assesses Sawyer’s and Ball’s arguments and compares their ac-
counts’ alleged advantages to the naive account’s explanatory potential. Further-
more, the paper proposes an alternative take on interpreting disagreements in the
presence of conceptual pluralism. It suggests to “go meta”, and thus interpret the
relevant disagreements as metalinguistic negotiations (see Plunkett/Sundell 2013,
Plunkett 2015).
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next two sections introduce and dis-
cuss Sawyer’s dual-aspect theory, while sections 4 and 5 are concerned with Ball’s
account and an exploration of our practice of voicing arguments when we are in-
volved in disputes of amelioration. Section 6 briefly concludes. As we will see,
“going meta” in our interpretation of controversies is not only compatible with a
naive  picture  of  conceptual  engineering;  it  is  also  explanatorily  fruitful.  Pace
Sawyer and Ball, it can explain the point of our arguments when involved in dis-
putes like Olivia’s and Paul’s. Neither Sawyer’s dual-aspect theory nor Ball’s idea
of revisionary analyses is required to accommodate our feeling of genuine dis-
agreement and topic continuity in such cases. As a result, the naive view is on
equal footing with (if not superior to) theoretically more demanding accounts such
as Sawyer’s and Ball’s.
II. Sawyer’s dual-aspect theory
According  to  Sawyer’s externalist dual-aspect  theory  of  representation  (2018,
2020), non-indexical terms such as “marriage” have two aspects which are to be
carefully  distinguished from each other.  On the one hand they  have linguistic
meanings,  which supervene on patterns of usage across linguistic communities.
Such patterns of usage often change over time. “Language is organic”, as Sawyer
(2020, 384) puts it, and the history of the term “meat” is one of many examples
for this.5 The meaning of “meat” has shifted over centuries from [food] to [animal
flesh eaten for food] while only the latter is what “meat” means today, of course.
In  addition  to  meanings  which  non-indexical  terms  like  “marriage”  or  “meat”
have, such terms also  express concepts.  In contrast  to  meanings,  concepts  are
mental representations, constituents of thought, rather than linguistically encoded
5 For a conception of meanings as species-like entities see Richard (2019, 2020), who suggests
understanding conceptual engineering “as an attempt to foster a kind of evolution within a
population” (2020, 377). On his account, conceptual engineers try bringing about so-called c-
changes, i.e. changes in certain presuppositions accompanied by speakers’ usages of particular
terms.
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semantic contents of language. On Sawyer’s account, concepts are not individu-
ated by speakers’ individual or communally shared conceptions of the world but
by how the world is objectively. As we possibly misconceive various aspects of
reality, we can possess and employ a concept  c  while still being fundamentally
wrong about the nature of objects represented by c.
This separation of meanings, which terms have, and concepts, which terms ex-
press – or, as Sawyer puts it: talk and thought – also shapes her understanding of
conceptual engineering. According to Sawyer, processes of amelioration do not in-
clude any elimination, revision or replacement of  concepts. Instead, on her pic-
ture, conceptual engineering is all about changing the meanings of certain terms, it
is about aiming to bring “the extension of a linguistic meaning of a term in line
with the extension of the concept it expresses” (2020, 391). On her account, for
instance, the meaning of “rape” did change over time, from a meaning excluding
intra-marital transgressions to one including them. Yet, the concept which “rape”
expressed over the centuries and still expresses has remained untouched by femin-
ist  struggles.  Although  its  meaning  has  changed  along  with  the  term’s  usage,
“rape” still expresses the same concept as it did 200 years ago, according to Saw-
yer. Back then, speakers were simply wrong about the nature of objects represen-
ted by the concept of rape. They did grasp the linguistic meaning of “rape”, how-
ever, and thus generally used this term in line with its correct meaning at that
time.
***
Certainly, this rather unorthodox separation of meanings and concepts is in special
need of justification, and likewise is Sawyer’s resulting take on conceptual engin-
eering. As already indicated in section 1, disputes between pre- and post-amelior-
ators are supposed to play a key role in this. To sufficiently accommodate facts of
meaning change as well as intuitions of genuine disagreement over a single sub-
ject  matter/topic6,  Sawyer  thinks  it  is  required  to  draw  a  distinction  between
meanings and concepts. So, let’s briefly examine her understanding of such dis-
putes in a bit more detail and see which phenomena are supposed to motivate her
account.
Take the example of “rape” again and assume (with Sawyer) that speakers of the
18th and early 19th century were using this  term – semantically correctly – for
6 The terms ‘topic(s)’ and ‘subject matter(s)’ are used interchangeably in this paper.
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sexual assaults outside marriages only.7 Fortunately, patterns of usage changed.
On the  assumption  that  meaning supervenes  on  usage,  the  meaning of  “rape”
plausibly changed as well.  I  am happy to grant these assumptions. Yet,  taking
these circumstances into account, Sawyer now considers disputes like the follow-
ing:
Anciento (around  1800):  “There  cannot  be rape  between  husband  and
wife.”
Nowy (in 2020): “Rape between married partners is possible. A husband
can rape his husband or wife, and a wife can rape her wife or husband.”
Anciento  and  Nowy  are  using  “rape”  differently,  each  semantically  correctly.
However, it seems as if their dispute would not simply dissolve if they learned
about this difference in usage and the change of meaning. There seems to be genu-
ine  disagreement  between them,  which  can  survive  such disambiguation.8 But
how should we accommodate this impression of genuine disagreement between
our speakers? Genuine disagreement is disagreement over a single subject matter
and sameness of subject matter appears to require a single propositional content
over the truth of which the parties disagree. A single propositional content in turn
appears to require sameness of linguistic meaning, according to Sawyer (2020,
386).  “Rape”,  however,  does  not  have the  same  meaning  in  Anciento’s  and
Nowy’s utterances. Due to a change in usage, the meaning of “rape” has changed
over time. Therefore, according to Sawyer, if we do not separate meanings from
concepts,  we cannot  construe a  single topic Anciento and Nowy are disputing
about.  We fail  to accommodate the intuition of genuine disagreement between
them. “Linguistic meaning cannot both supervene on use and determine a stable
subject matter”, as Sawyer (2020, 386) puts the problem. Hence, she concludes
that “two representational elements are required; one to supervene on use, and the
other to determine a stable subject matter” (2020, 387).9
7 In support of this assumption see Hasday’s (2000) detailed study of the legal history of marital
rape.
8 According to Sawyer (2018, 2020) things are different regarding meaning shifts of terms such
as “meat”. In such cases, disambiguation would dissolve a dispute, since it would make clear
that “the subject matter of the term ‘meat’ in Shakespeare’s time is not the same as the subject
matter of the term ‘meat’ now” (2020, 386). See more on this later.
9 Drawing on  a  puzzle introduced by  Sainsbury  (2014),  Sawyer  (2018,  2020)  discusses  an
analogous sample case: a dispute between two speakers A and B uttering “Whales are fish” at
t1 and “Whales are not fish” at t2 respectively.  While B uses “whale” as competent speakers
are using it today, A uses “whale” at t1 to mean “a very large fish with a streamlined hairless
body, a horizontal tail fin, and a blowhole on top of the head for breathing” (Sawyer (2018,
133-4); my emphasis).  On Sawyer’s account,  A  and  B  are using “whale” divergently, each
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To solve the alleged tension between meaning change and genuine disagreement,
Sawyer’s  dual-aspect  theory  introduces  concepts as  the  supposedly  required
second representational element. According to Sawyer, it is only by distinguishing
between concepts and meanings that we can plausibly explain what is going on in
controversies like Anciento’s and Nowy’s.  Although the  meaning of “rape” has
changed, the concept this term expresses has remained the same. It is this stability
of concept which then secures the required continuity of topic across centuries.
“Where there is stability of subject matter through linguistic change, it is concepts
that explain the stability”. It is thus “also concepts that explain the possibility of
genuine disagreement over a single subject matter” (2018, 145).
III. Against Sawyer’s account
As intriguing as the dual-aspect idea of representation is, it faces two problems.
On the one hand, separating meanings from concepts is, pace Sawyer,  not  re-
quired to account for topic continuity and genuine disagreement in cases of mean-
ing shift (problem 1). Instead, we can stick to the default of equating meanings
with concepts and still explain how there is a single, continuous topic speakers
like Nowy and Anciento can disagree about. On the other hand, even if we do sub-
scribe to Sawyer’s separation of meanings and concepts, it can be shown that it is
not  sameness  of  concepts  which  eventually  secures  topic continuity over  time
(problem 2). The reason is simple: there are cases of dispute across centuries in
which a relevant term  e  uttered by the speakers expresses the  same concept on
Sawyer’s account, but the speakers are still talking about different topics. And ad-
ditionally, we can find cases of disputes across centuries in which e expresses dif-
ferent concepts according to Sawyer, yet the speakers are talking about the same
topic nonetheless.  Even within Sawyer’s account,  concept continuity and topic
continuity therefore turn out to be two independent phenomena. 
The following two subsections lay out these two problems in reverse order. §3
briefly concludes this part of the paper.
being semantically correct at their time. Nonetheless, we have the intuition that their exchange
reflects genuine  disagreement.  Yet, “[s]ubstantive  disagreement  requires  agreement  in
meaning”, as Sainsbury (2014, 4) puts it. Sawyer – agreeing with Sainsbury’s general idea that
disagreement requires conflicting content expressed by the disputants’ utterances – therefore
sees the need for a second kind of representational element (in addition to meanings). (Note
that  Sainsbury’s  puzzle  is  originally  about  the  disputants’ divergent  usage of  “fish”,  not
“whale”.)
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1 Concept continuity and topic continuity
Let’s start the discussion by pointing at an assumption which Sawyer and I agree
on. Take a dispute in which one party  A is uttering a statement of the form “p”
while the opposing party B utters a statement of the form “~p”. Sawyer’s account
is based on the assumption that their dispute should not be construed as reflecting
genuine disagreement if the two speakers are not talking about the same subject
matter/topic. I agree. In fact, following B. Balcerak Jackson (2014), I take it to be
an essential attribute of merely verbal disputes that the parties in such disputes are
talking about different topics and therefore merely past each other. (For more on
this see below.) I disagree with Sawyer, however, on taking concept continuity as
essential for securing topic continuity in cases of meaning change.
Consider disputes over centuries of the form “p” and “~p” (like Anciento’s and
Nowy’s). Sawyer argues that there is a relevant term e contained in “p” (such as
“rape”) which is used with different meanings by the speakers while it expresses
the same concept in both of their utterances. Or, as Sawyer puts it: due to the dif-
ference in meaning, the propositional linguistic content of both of the disputants’
utterances differs; but “p” expresses the same propositional  thought content, for
the concept expressed by e remains constant across centuries. It is this stability of
concept/thought content which is supposed to be required to secure topic continu-
ity and hence genuine disagreement over time.10 As this subsection argues, though,
even in cases of meaning change and even within Sawyer’s account, the connec-
tion between concept continuity and topic continuity is much looser than Sawyer
makes it seem. 
Just for the sake of the argument, let’s subscribe to Sawyer’s idea of separating
meanings from concepts, i.e. linguistic content from thought content. If it really
were concept continuity (in Sawyer’s sense) which secured topic continuity over
time, then it would certainly be surprising to find cases of (i) same concept but
different topics, and (ii) different concepts but same topic. As the following two
sample cases demonstrate, however, such cases do exist.
Case 1: Merely Verbal Dispute
Let’s come back to our sample case of Anciento and Nowy again.
10 Note that disagreement  may not only be construed as a matter of conflicting beliefs  (even if
this paper, just for ease of exposition, mostly talks as if it were). But two persons can also be
in  disagreement  if  they  have  different  nondoxastic  attitudes  towards the  same  thing,  for
instance. See esp. MacFarlane (2014, ch. 6) for different notions of disagreement and Ridge
(2014, ch. 6) for a discussion of disagreement in attitude.
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Anciento (around  1800):  “There  cannot  be rape  between  husband  and
wife.”
Nowy (in 2020): “Rape between married partners is possible. A husband
can rape his husband or wife, and a wife can rape her wife or husband.”
Following Sawyer, I assume that the meaning of “rape” has changed over centur-
ies from a meaning excluding intra-marital transgressions to a meaning including
them. The speakers are using “rape” with divergent meanings. 
Nevertheless, “rape” expresses the same concept in Anciento’s and Nowy’s state-
ment, according to Sawyer. It is important to note, however, that even if this were
the case, subscribing to an interpretation of Anciento’s and Nowy’s dispute as re-
flecting genuine disagreement would not be the only option. Sure, on the face of
it, the speakers seem to hold competing beliefs on a single subject matter. But de-
pending on the speakers’ specific communicative intentions in the context of utter-
ance, an interpretation of them as merely talking past each other might also be a
viable option. In this case, the speakers would merely use “rape” differently, with
different speakers’ meaning,  while not disagreeing on what the other party is in-
tending to convey by their utterance. The two speakers might be willing to inter-
pret the other party as speaking the truth in their own language, as Hirsch (2005)
would put it. Using “rape” in its pre-ameliorated meaning of his time, Anciento
would simply intend to convey that there cannot be rapepre between husband and
wife. Nowy, in contrast, could correctly use “rape” to mean that rapepost is possible
between married partners. 
It is thus  possible that our two speakers are having a merely verbal dispute al-
though, on Sawyer’s account, “rape” expresses the same concept in both of their
assertions.  Their  dispute  could resolve after a disambiguation.  If Anciento and
Nowy are merely talking past each other, however, they are not disagreeing on
what the other party is intending to convey with their utterance. They are then not
offering conflicting views on a single subject matter. Instead, in line with B. Bal-
cerak Jackson’s (2014) prominent account of merely verbal disputes, it seems nat-
ural to construe them as offering compatible views on different subject matters.11
After all, the reason why speakers are merely talking past each other is that they
11 According to B. Balcerak Jackson (2014), merely verbal disputes are defined as disputes in
which  speakers  address  questions  about  different  subject  matters  while  offering  non-
conflicting answers to these questions. So, following Balcerak Jackson’s account, in a context
in which the dispute between Anciento and Nowy is merely verbal, there is no specific topic
under discussion about which the speakers offer conflicting opinions.
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are not talking (and disagreeing) about the same. Unbeknownst to them, speakers
in a merely verbal dispute are conveying thoughts about slightly different topics
instead,  about  which  they  do not  disagree  (see  also  Knoll  (2020)  and  Pinder
(2019: 21) on this). Disambiguation therefore works in such cases, “because it
separates what are clearly two distinct subject matters”, as Sawyer (2020, 386)
puts it. So, also according to Sawyer, speakers in a merely verbal dispute are con-
cerned with different topics.
To be sure, it is not obligatory to interpret the above dispute as a merely verbal
dispute about two distinct topics – rapepre and rapepost. But it certainly is possible.
Also note that interpreting the speakers as merely talking past each other does not
exclude the possibility of them having further disputes which do involve genuine
disagreement. After realising that Anciento is merely using “rape” differently –
i.e. after dissolving the merely verbal dispute at hand –, Nowy could, for instance,
still object to Anciento’s usage of this term in a second step and start arguing with
him again. In this case, Nowy would still agree that his adversary’s assertion was
true in the language of Anciento’s time. Yet, Nowy could still find the language of
this time objectionable. And as a result Nowy could begin a new dispute about the
right usage of “rape” with Anciento. Hence, even if the dispute between Nowy
and Anciento were a merely verbal dispute,  this  would not mean that the two
speakers could not also have a dispute concerning the usage of “rape”. After all,
dissolving merely verbal disputes between speakers does not always lead to agree-
ment about related topics. 
To briefly sum up this first case: the interpretation of Anciento’s and Nowy’s dis-
pute as a merely verbal one is certainly not the only option available. But the fact
that it is possible to construe them as merely talking past each other seems enough
to show that  it  is  not  concept  continuity which secures  topic continuity in  all
cases.  Even  within  Sawyer’s  account,  there  plausibly  are cases  in  which  the
speakers express the same concept but are still talking about different topics.
Case 2: Metalinguistic Negotiation
Are there also cases of dispute across centuries in which a term expresses different
concepts  according to  Sawyer,  yet  the  speakers  are  still  disagreeing about  the
same topic? There are indeed. Take the example of the term “meat”. According to
Sawyer (2018, 141), not only the linguistic meaning of this term shifted over time
but  also  the  concept expressed  by  “meat”  around  1600  is  different  from the
concept that “meat” expresses today. However, it seems still possible to construe
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speakers  who are  using  “meat” in  different  centuries  as  genuinely  disagreeing
over one and the same topic. Take two speakers, Oberon and Pamela, saying
Oberon (in 1600): “Meat is meat.”
Pamela (today): “Meat is not meat.”
On Sawyer’s picture, “meat” expresses different concepts in each of their two as-
sertions. Thus, according to her, there is no single propositional  thought content
(p) which is expressed by Oberon’s and negated by Pamela’s assertion.12 
Still, the two can be discussing a single topic on which they genuinely disagree.
So, pace Sawyer, it is actually not the case that “any appearance of disagreement
is merely superficial” (2018, 141) in such a case. To see this, assume, for instance,
that Oberon and Pamela are both talking to their little sons, telling them for which
objects speakers should use the term “meat”. Vegetarian Pamela thinks that speak-
ers should not use the term “meat” for meat, but try establishing the more explicit
term “animal flesh” instead (her idea being that it would be preferable to use an
expression that reminds people of the fact that it is actually animals they are eat-
ing when eating meat). Thus, Pamela is uttering “Meat is not (to be called) meat”
to make a metalinguistic point about the (in her opinion) morally wrong usage of
“meat”: do not use “meat” for meat! Taciturn Oberon in contrast intends to tell his
son (unhelpfully) that “meat” is to be used for food in general (i.e. what “meat”
means in Oberon’s statement, uttered around Shakespeare’s time). Oberon thinks
speakers should simply use a term in line with its linguistic meaning. As a con-
sequence, there is in fact genuine disagreement over centuries between Oberon in
1600 and Pamela in 2021 although, according to Sawyer, the term “meat” in their
utterances not only has a different meaning but also expresses a different concept.
Oberon  believes  that  “meat”  should  be  used  for  all  food  including  animals,
Pamela, however, disagrees. She is convinced that, when referring to meat, we
should only use expressions that remind people of what it is they are eating.13
12 On Sawyer’s picture, there also is no propositional linguistic content, expressed by Oberon’s
and negated by Pamela’s assertion, of course. For “meat” also changed its meaning over time.
13 Just for the sake of the argument, assume for a moment that there is a linguistic community in
which “meat” has such lexical effects. Say, for instance, vegans in A’s linguistic community
introduced  the  term “meat”  as  an  expression  for  meat  because  in  A’s  language this  term
reminds people that meat is in fact animal flesh. In this case, I take it, there would be no
relevant disagreement between A and Pamela on how best to use “meat”. For, given what this
term means and which lexical effects it has in A’s language, Pamela would agree to use “meat”
for animal flesh in A’s linguistic community. And given what “meat” means and which lexical
effects this expression has in Pamela’s language,  A  would agree that speakers of Pamela’s
linguistic community should not use this term for meat.
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So, as Sawyer correctly assumes, “[l]inguistic meaning cannot both supervene on
use and determine a stable subject matter”. And as outlined in the last section, this
is why she introduces a second representational element – concepts – to do the
job. However, as Pamela’s and Oberon’s case shows, it isn’t concept continuity
either which generally explains the stability of topic across centuries. For, appar-
ently, there can be topic continuity without concept continuity. In the above dis-
pute, “meat” expresses different concepts in Oberon’s and Pamela’s utterances,
according to Sawyer.  Still,  Oberon and Pamela  do talk and disagree about the
same metalinguistic topic – the question of how to best use “meat”. The proposi-
tions they intend to convey with their  utterances are incompatible.  And this is
enough to accommodate disagreement between them. (For more on this also see
below.)
***
Let’s quickly recapitulate. As we have seen, even if we subscribe to Sawyer’s ac-
count, it is not concept continuity which generally establishes a continuity of topic
in cases of meaning change. On the one hand, there are cases in which a relevant
term (such as “rape”) expresses the same concept but the speakers using this term
are merely talking past each other and are thus speaking about divergent subject
matters. And, on the other hand, there are cases in which speakers are genuinely
disagreeing about the same topic although Sawyer would construe their utterances
as expressing different thought contents. In other words: we also find cases of
topic continuity without concept continuity. Even within Sawyer’s account, there
is thus no close or stable explanatory connection between topics and concepts.
2 An alternative explanation
Let’s now move on to the second, more general goal of this section: pace Sawyer,
separating meanings from concepts is not required to account for topic continuity.
Instead, if we “go meta” in our interpretation of disputes between pre- and post-
ameliorators,  we  can  accommodate  our  impression  of  genuine  disagreement
without subscribing to Sawyer’s picture. To see this, let’s come back to our ex-
ample of Anciento and Nowy.
Anciento  (around  1800):  “There  cannot  be  rape  between  husband  and
wife.”
Nowy (in 2020): “Rape between married partners is possible. A husband
can rape his wife or husband, and a wife can rape her husband or wife.”
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As stressed in the last subsection, the right interpretation of a dispute hinges on
the particular context of the dispute. For instance, there certainly is a possible con-
text in which Anciento and Nowy are merely talking past each other due to their
divergent usages of “rape”. However, in another context, things might be very dif-
ferent. In particular, it seems a viable option to interpret Anciento’s and Nowy’s
dispute in analogy to Oberon’s and Pamela’s argument above. If we “go meta” in
our interpretation of such disputes, we can easily accommodate our impression of
genuine disagreement in light of meaning change. And we can do so even if we
refute Sawyer’s separation of meanings and concepts.
According to a metalinguistic interpretation of the above dispute, there is a pro-
position over whose truth Anciento and Nowy are genuinely disagreeing: the pro-
position that “rape” should be used for intra-marital sexual assaults, too.14 This
proposition concerns the (morally appropriate) usage of a term – and I agree that it
is not literally expressed by what Nowy is saying. After all, Nowy (as well as An-
ciento) is  using  “rape” and not mentioning it. But this is exactly how metalin-
guistic negotiations are supposed to work. In metalinguistic negotiations, the rel-
evant “linguistic expression is used (not mentioned) to communicate information
about the appropriate usage of that very expression in context”, as Plunkett and
Sundell (2013, 3) put it. I also agree with Sawyer that the propositions expressed
by Anciento’s and Nowy’s assertions – the linguistic propositions in Sawyer’s jar-
gon – are compatible.  After all,  “rape” has changed its meaning from 1800 to
today. Plunkett and Sundell, too, point to this possibility of compatible proposi-
tional linguistic contents when setting up their account of metalinguistic negoti-
ations: “genuine disagreements can be expressed in disputes in which the speakers
literally express compatible contents” (2013, 12). However, Sawyer seems to mis-
understand what Plunkett and Sundell’s thesis amounts to. For her, their account
refutes the “mainstream position on disagreement” by implying that “disagree-
ment  can  be accommodated without  appeal  to  a  shared  propositional  content”
(2020,  387).  She  then  construes  her  theory  as  offering  an  allegedly  superior
“middle way”. That is, she a) agrees “with Plunkett and Sundell that substantive
disagreement does not require sameness of linguistic meaning”; but she b) also
sticks to the supposed mainstream in assuming that there has to be some “single
propositional content over the truth of which the parties to the dispute disagree”
14 There  are  in  fact  several  propositions  over  whose truth-value  the  speakers  are genuinely
disagreeing in their dispute. E.g., there is the further proposition that “rape” should not be used
for extra-marital transgressions. For ease of exposition, this section will only focus on Nowy’s
utterance and the proposition mentioned.
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(2020,  388).  For  Sawyer,  of  course,  this  propositional  content  is  thought,  i.e.
concept content. Pace Sawyer, however, Plunkett and Sundell’s account does not
imply that there is no single propositional content in cases of metalinguistic dis-
agreement over the truth of which the disputants disagree.15 On the contrary, there
is a proposition over whose truth Anciento and Nowy disagree, namely the meta-
linguistic proposition that “rape” should be used for intra-marital transgressions,
too. Of course, this metalinguistic content Anciento and Nowy disagree about is
not literally expressed by one of their utterances; it is merely pragmatically con-
veyed by what Nowy is saying. But this does not mean that there is no single pro-
positional content the parties are disagreeing about. Quite the contrary.16
So, to again briefly summarise my point: if we are “going meta” in our interpreta-
tion of the above controversy, we easily find a topic Anciento and Nowy are likely
to be disagreeing about: the right usage of “rape”. Anciento is pleading for a usage
of “rape” according to which this term is to be used for extra-marital transgres-
sions only. Nowy, in contrast, pragmatically communicates his conflicting opinion
on this: according to him, “rape” is to be used for sexual violence inside mar-
riages, too. This interpretation of their dispute does not hinge on any separation of
meanings  and concepts.  “Going meta”  simply  leaves  Sawyer’s  distinction  un-
called-for.
3 Conclusion
§1 of this section demonstrated that even if we take Sawyer’s unorthodox separa-
tion of meanings and concepts for granted, topic and concept continuity come out
as two independent phenomena. According to the counterexamples I have presen-
ted, two disputants accidentally talking about  different topics – and thus merely
past each other – can still discuss what (in Sawyer’s terms) is the  same thought
content.  Furthermore,  two  speakers  can  express  (their  negation  of)  divergent
thought contents while nonetheless disagreeing on one and the same topic. Pace
Sawyer, it thus need not be “concepts that explain the possibility of genuine dis-
agreement over a single subject matter” (2018, 145).
As was laid out in §2, acknowledging the option of “going meta” also undermines
the urgent need for Sawyer’s distinction. Pace Sawyer, separating meanings from
15  Also see Plunkett and Sundell’s (2013, 11) proposal for an analysis of a workable notion of
disagreement actually named “Disagreement Requires Conflict in Content”.
16 That is not some special feature of metalinguistic negotiations. In disputes in which speakers
are  not negotiating  the  usage  or  meaning  of  a  term,  the  propositional  content  they  are
disagreeing about need not be literally expressed by what the speakers are saying either. (Also
see e.g. Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 12-13) on this.)
14
concepts is not required to account for genuine disagreement in light of meaning
change. If we construe cases like Anciento’s and Nowy’s as metalinguistic negoti-
ations, we can interpret disputants as genuinely disagreeing over a single continu-
ous topic: the right usage of a term. This interpretation only depends on a distinc-
tion  between  contents  literally  expressed by  speakers’ assertions  and  contents
pragmatically conveyed by the speakers. But it can do without distinguishing con-
cepts from meanings. Conceptual pluralism and disagreement are fully compat-
ible.
To be sure, the considerations of this section do not vindicate a metalinguistic in-
terpretation of all possible disputes between pre- and post-ameliorators. However,
they at least show that the metalinguistic picture is an equivalent contender to
Sawyer’s account, that is worthy of a more detailed discussion. Also note that the
burden of proof might now be on Sawyer. Her separation of meanings and con-
cepts not only goes against current orthodoxy in the philosophy of language. By
stipulating a second representational element, her account is also less simple and
parsimonious than the naive picture. If there is no good reason to abandon the na-
ive picture, then sticking to it seems prima facie preferable. As this section has ar-
gued, Sawyer has not provided us with a strong reason to subscribe to her view.
It is not as if there were no potential reasons which could cast some doubt on the
adequacy of “going meta”. There are. And as the following discussion of Ball’s
(2020) account shows, the supposed downsides of “going meta” might be in need
of further justification. It is just that a detailed discussion is yet to come. Until the
matter is settled, the metalinguistic picture should not be ruled out prematurely.17
IV. Ball’s account and his argument argument
Sawyer’s view is not the only account which is incompatible with the naive view
of conceptual pluralism presented in the introduction. Ball (2020) lines up against
the naive picture as well. In contrast to Sawyer, though, he is not arguing for set-
ting apart meanings and concepts. Instead, his account builds on the controversial
idea of revisionary analyses. 
17 In particular, the metalinguistic account has to deal with the problem of speakers explicitly
refusing an interpretation of their dispute as a metalinguistic negotiation (see section 5). Yet,
Sawyer’s  view is also not without its problems. After all,  Sawyer suggests abandoning the
common sense picture of concepts as meanings without having provided a really strong reason
for doing so. Overall, it therefore seems fair to see the two accounts as equivalent contenders,
at least for the time being.
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According to Ball, projects of conceptual engineering such as Sally Haslanger’s
(2000) ameliorative approach to the concept of women, for instance, neither aim
at meaning/concept change nor the introduction of a new meaning/concept. As red
pandas are no pandas, conceptual engineers are no engineers, according to Ball.
Rather, instead of altering/replacing the meanings of contested terms, conceptual
engineers aim at revisionary analyses of terms such as “women”. These analyses
are “revisionary, in that they depart from present usage and beliefs”, Ball (2020,
37) tells us, “but are still descriptive in that they are making a claim about what
we mean now and have meant all along.” They are supposed to be successful if at
the end of a discourse speakers are willing to subscribe to them. So if in the case
of “women”, for instance, speakers really came to use this term such that it comes
out true that  women are systematically subordinated on the basis of certain ob-
served or imagined bodily features, then Haslanger’s proposed revisionary ana-
lysis of “women” would turn out to be a success. It would then really determine
the meaning of “women”.18 A general acceptance of the proposed analysis, how-
ever, would not only fix what this term means from then on; it would also settle
what “women” has meant already the whole time. So, on Ball’s metasemantic pic-
ture, the meaning “women” has now is determined at least in part by future facts.
As Sawyer takes her separation of meanings and concepts to be  required, Ball,
too, takes his view on conceptual engineering to be inevitable.  According to Ball,
his 
view is superior to the alternatives defended by most proponents of “con-
ceptual  ethics” and “conceptual  engineering”  (according to  which  revi-
sionary theorizing involves replacing words or concepts) because it better
explains the arguments we advance when we engage with proposed revi-
sionary analyses. (2020, abstract)
As Ball maintains, we should favour his account since only his account is able to
sufficiently explain what is going on in argumentative disputes such as the follow-
ing:
Olivia: “The purpose of marriage is to produce children. Therefore, same-
sex couples cannot be married.”
Paul: “I disagree. Marriage isn’t a relation between men and women only.
Same-sex couples can be married. (And I also reject your premise: the pur-
pose of marriage is not to produce children.)”
18 For a critique of Haslanger’s suggestion see e.g. Jenkins (2016).
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Let’s consider this dispute in a bit more detail. According to Ball, Olivia and Paul
argue for different views on marriage (not: “marriage”) here. And depending on
which of  their  views eventually  succeeds, the  meaning of  “marriage”  will  get
fixed accordingly. So, “marriage” does not get a  new meaning if one proposal
comes out ahead, but “a successful stipulation fixes the meaning of the word as it
was used all along” (2020, 51). Allegedly then, the meaning of “marriage” is the
same in both of the speakers’ statements, which is why, on Ball’s account, we can
construe Olivia and Paul as talking about the same topic without difficulty. 
Some views, in contrast, are unable to do so, according to Ball. According to these
subject-change views,  opponents  and proponents  of  same-sex  marriage  simply
employ different concepts of marriage. With his assertion, Paul thus changes the
subject: as he is using “marriage” differently, Paul is no longer talking about the
same phenomenon Olivia was talking about. As a consequence, subject-change
views fail to interpret disputants (such as Olivia and Paul) as making claims and
raising objections they take to be true and relevant to the debate at hand. Accord-
ing to Ball, such views fail to come up with an explanation of why disputants are
saying what they are saying and how their arguments bear on the issue discussed.
They “cannot make sense of many of the argumentative moves” pre- and post-
ameliorators make in their debates – in short: they “cannot explain the way we ar-
gue”.  According  to  Ball,  this  “constitutes  a  powerful  argument”  against  these
views. It is this argument on which Ball bases his unorthodox contender to the na-
ive picture. He names it the argument argument (2020, 41).
Admittedly, construing arguments such as the above as metalinguistic negotiations
also means subscribing to a subject-change view. When involved in a metalin-
guistic negotiation, speakers are expressing different concepts with a commonly
used term e. And usually, they aim at a revision or replacement of concepts when
negotiating this term’s proper usage – in other words: they aim at changing the
meaning of  e. Consequently, resolved metalinguistic negotiations (at least often)
result in a change of topic, for better or worse. If, for instance, the meaning of
“marriage” changes due to, say, a widespread public debate, then people pre- and
post-amelioration will talk about  different topics when uttering “marriage”: mar-
riage and marriage*. Despite this long-term effect of topic change, however, there
remains a plausible explanation of what is going on in relevant debates between
pre- and post-ameliorators. If we “go meta” in our interpretation of these debates,
then not only can we construe such disputes as being about the  same metalin-
guistic topic. One can also make sense of the way disputants like Olivia and Paul
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are arguing. Presupposing that they are covertly discussing metalinguistic topics
(despite using and not mentioning “marriage”), Ball’s argument argument does
not constitute a challenge to the naive picture of conceptual engineering. (As poin-
ted out in the next section, though, Ball’s argument might in fact challenge his
own view.)
Let me be clear about what Ball and I agree on. As we have seen, Olivia comes up
with the following premise in her reasoning: 
(1) “The purpose of marriage is to produce children.”
Now suppose, we read Olivia’s conclusion (C) as a metalinguistic statement about
“marry”/“marriage”. That is, assume that by uttering 
(C) “Same-sex couples cannot be married” 
Olivia intends to convey that “marry”/“marriage” should not be used for relations
between same-sex couples. Admittedly then, it is hard to see any way that Olivia’s
premise (1) would (or should) directly convince Paul of her metalinguistic conclu-
sion (C) if we do not “go meta” in interpreting premise (1) as well. To vary this
thought: I agree that it is in fact hard to understand how Olivia’s premise (1) might
directly persuade Paul of a metalinguistic conclusion if we do not “go meta” in
our interpretation of (1), too. 
But, as I see it, it is prima facie plausible not only to “go meta” in our interpreta-
tion  of  (C)  but  also  to  read  (1)  as  intended  to  communicate  a  metalinguistic
thought: the thought that the terms “marriage” and “marry” should only be used
for relations whose alleged purpose it is to produce children. Interpreting Olivia as
communicating this  metalinguistic  thought with (1) does provide a  straightfor-
ward explanation of the way she argues. Olivia simply tries to convince Paul of a
metalinguistic conclusion by assuming a metalinguistic premise.  So,  pace  Ball
(2020, 42), the metalinguistic picture  can  in fact account for the way pre- and
post-ameliorators argue. If we truly read Olivia’s and Paul’s (whole!) dispute as a
metalinguistic dispute about “marriage”/“marry”, then we can construe the parties
as intending to convey conflicting metalinguistic thoughts, which they both take
to be true and relevant to the debate at hand. Given a metalinguistic interpretation
of what is going on, Ball’s argument argument against the naive view therefore
fails. 
To be sure, Ball wants to read the arguments advanced in such debates as first-or-
der arguments:
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[O]pponents of same-sex marriage […] sometimes claim that the purpose
of marriage is to produce children. This is (or at least seems to be) an argu-
ment about marriage (rather than an argument about “marriage”.) (2020,
39)
So, Ball explicitly rejects a metalinguistic reading of sentences like (1). But as far
as I can see, he does not provide any substantial reasons for why we should really
follow him in this regard. That such statements are not about the proper usage of
terms is a crucial step in his line of argument, however. After all, if we understand
speakers like Olivia and Paul as communicating metalinguistic thoughts, then sub-
scribing to Ball’s unorthodox account is no longer inevitable.19
That Ball does not  cite any reasons to avoid “going meta” does not mean that
there are no such reasons. Yet the mere fact that speakers do not mention but use
terms like “marriage” differently is not a particularly strong reason. This is be-
cause metalinguistic  negotiations are  precisely characterised by speakers using
terms differently (see section 3). There might nevertheless be a reason to remain
sceptical about “going meta” and this certainly deserves a more thorough discus-
sion. The next section can only hint at this discussion. However, the section will
already show that Ball’s account remains far from being vindicated. The naive
picture is strong enough to stay in the game. 
V. Speakers’ errors and the argument argument revisited
Let’s start the discussion by going back to Ball’s example of Olivia and Paul:
Olivia: “The purpose of marriage is to produce children. Therefore, same-
sex couples cannot be married.”
Paul: “I disagree. Marriage isn’t a relation between men and women only.
Same-sex couples can be married.”
As we have seen in the last section, if we read the speakers as communicating
metalinguistic thoughts about “marriage”/“marry” with their utterances, we can
easily explain the way they argue.  But what  if,  on further inspection,  the two
19 Towards the end of his paper (2020, 52-3), Ball discusses cases of belief revision reflected in
sentences like “I used to think that two women could not marry each other, but now I see that I
was wrong”. And he takes such sentences as expressing belief revisions about marriage, not
“marriage”. But why shouldn’t we interpret speakers as reporting belief revisions about the
proper usage of terms with such statements? As before, Ball does not provide any reason for
this beyond an appeal to intuition. (For why we shouldn’t rely too heavily on intuitions in the
present context, see the following section.)
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parties reject a metalinguistic understanding of their assertions? What if they ex-
plicitly  refuse  to  be interpreted  as  pragmatically  conveying any metalinguistic
propositions? What if they want to be understood as only communicating incom-
patible first-order views on marriage instead? This certainly seems possible. And,
as Thomasson (2017) and Plunkett  and Sundell   (2014, 2019) have noticed,  it
prima facie spells trouble for the metalinguistic account. For especially on a clas-
sic Gricean (1975) understanding of conversational implicature – and let’s sup-
pose  this  really  is  the  pragmatic  mechanism underlying  metalinguistic  negoti-
ations20 – the speakers would have to  intend to  pragmatically convey metalin-
guistic content with their first-order utterances. But if Olivia and Paul deny having
such intentions, then this seems like a good reason to refrain from “going meta” in
our interpretation of what they most plausibly mean.
If friends of the metalinguistic picture want to “go meta” even in such cases of ex-
plicit denial, then they have to come up with an explanation of why we should dis-
trust the disputants’ avowals. They have to explain why speakers err about their
own communicative intents (also see Belleri (2020, 4) on this). As Plunkett and
Sundell as well as Thomasson have pointed out, providing such an explanation is
possible.  After  all,  the  semantics-pragmatics  distinction  is  technically  heavy-
weight  and often rather  subtle.  It  might  therefore not be too surprising to  see
speakers not having a firm grasp of what exactly it is they intend to pragmatically
communicate with their assertions. That speakers are often wrong about what their
dispute  really  is about also looks overly familiar. So, even if speakers explicitly
refuse a metalinguistic interpretation, we might still have reasons to take this to be
the best interpretation possible. Yet, even so, explaining why some pre- and post-
ameliorators are wrong about how to correctly interpret their own utterances is
certainly still  a price proponents of a metalinguistic interpretation have to pay.
(Even if this price might not be that high.)21 But should we therefore give up on
“going meta” and subscribe to Ball’s unorthodox account instead? I don’t think so.
20 Also see Plunkett and Sundell (2019, 12-13) for other, less problematic  options as well as
Thomasson (2017, 23-5) for a brief illustration of how disputants involved in a metalinguistic
negotiation  might  be  understood  as  performing  metaconventional  speech  acts  instead  of
pragmatically conveying informational content.
21 Of course, this is only a price they have to  pay if they stick to the idea that the speakers,
unbeknownst to them, are in fact discussing a metalinguistic topic. An alternative option for
proponents of the naive view might be to construe disputants like Olivia and Paul as merely
talking past each other in such cases.  To be sure, the speakers would then erroneously take
their dispute as reflecting genuine disagreement. Yet this error might be explainable. Because
even if the speakers are having a merely verbal dispute, there can still exist a metalinguistic
disagreement between them expressible in a further dispute. Hence, there is a dispute in the
vicinity which is still to be had and not merely verbal but about the proper usage of a term.
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On the one hand, his account, too, accuses speakers of making significant errors.
And on the other hand, Ball’s theory seems exposed to his very own argument ar-
gument presented in the last section. In what follows I will detail these two replies
in turn.
For a discussion of the first worry, let’s assume that some day in the future the lib-
erals’ stipulation is successful and sentences such as “Two men can marry each
other” turn out to be true. (Let’s also stipulate that this is not yet the case.) On
Ball’s view, this success would retrospectively determine the meaning of “mar-
riage” in Paul’s and Olivia’s dispute. That is, if (and when) conservatives come to
accept the liberals’ revisionary analysis of “marriage”,  this would not only de-
termine the meaning of this  term from then on. It  would also determine what
speakers meant by uttering “marriage” all along. Conservatives like Olivia would
have always been using “marriage” liberally. But, of course, this would come as a
surprise to them. And asked now whether by uttering sentences like (1) Olivia in-
tended to convey a thought about a) a relation between men and women only or b)
a relation which can hold between same-sex couples, too, Olivia would certainly
insist on a). According to Ball’s account, however, conservatives would err about
having conveyed a thought about relation a). Instead, contrary to what they be-
lieve, what they would have “meant all along is the relation that same-sex couples
can stand in” (2020, 53).
To be sure, speakers are sometimes wrong about the objects they pick out by us-
ing a linguistic term. Flat earthers, for instance, are wrong when thinking that they
are using the term “earth” to refer to something flat. So why worry about conser-
vatives being wrong in thinking that they have always used “marriage” to refer to
a relation between men and women only? One notable difference between these
two cases is that Ball, I take it, would not consider the sentence “The earth is
spherical” as being metasemantically analytic of “earth”. That is, he would not
take the meaning of “earth” to be determined by the stipulation that this sentence
is to be true. In contrast, however, he would see a sentence like “Two women can
marry each other” as metasemantically analytic of “marry” (provided that the lib-
erals’ analysis succeeds) (cf. 2020, 53).22 On Ball’s picture, conservatives there-
fore utter a number of  analytic falsehoods when being engaged in disputes with
22 A sentence is metasemantically analytic with respect to a word, according to Ball, “iff the
meaning of that […] word is partially fixed by the stipulation that the sentence is to be true”
(2020, 50). So, on Ball’s picture,  the stipulation of a sentence such as “Two men can marry
each other” as true partially determines the meaning of the word “marry”. The sentence is thus
metasemantically analytic with respect to this term.
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liberals like Paul. (Flat earthers, in contrast, do not make analytic mistakes about
the meaning of “earth” but simply err about the earth’s sphericity.)
To be sure, I am also happy to concede that speakers are sometimes making ana-
lytic mistakes. But interpreting speakers like Olivia as unknowingly expressing
the more liberal concept with “marriage” is certainly not the most charitable inter-
pretation of what these speakers are saying.23 (Note that, on the metalinguistic pic-
ture, Olivia is expressing the more narrow concept when speaking of “marriage”.)
What is more, it seems questionable whether construing speakers as broadly mak-
ing all kinds of analytic mistakes is really to be preferred over sometimes taking
them to be mistaken about the pragmatic import of their utterances. It is thus not
clear to me that, compared to the metalinguistic account, Ball’s view really is bet-
ter off in avoiding ascribing relevant errors to the speakers involved.
Most notably, though, Ball’s account is called into question by his own argument
argument.  According to  Ball,  subscribing to  his  idea of  retrospective meaning
stipulation is required. The metalinguistic view fails to spell out how “disputes
about revisionary analyses involve genuine disagreement”. According to Ball, it
“cannot explain how these disputes are conducted: it cannot explain the way we
argue” (2020, 41). As section 4 has argued, though, these allegations are unfoun-
ded. If we take the idea of metalinguistic interpretations seriously, Ball’s view is
not inevitable. 
What we have not spelled out in detail so far is how Ball’s own account answers
the argument argument, i.e. how Ball’s account explains the way disputants like
Olivia and Paul respond to reasons throughout their discourse. Let’s do this now.
Recall that the argument/premise Olivia provides for her conclusion 
(C)  “Same-sex couples cannot be married.”
is 
(1) “The purpose of marriage is to produce children.”
Now, Ball discusses two possible ways in which debates between proponents and
opponents of same-sex marriage might end up: (i) opponents like Olivia (O) con-
23 Also see Hirsch’s charity to understanding on this. According to this principle of interpretive
charity, “typical speakers of a language have a sufficiently adequate grasp of their linguistic
and  conceptual  resources  so  that  they  don’t  generally  make  a  priori  (conceptually)  false
assertions”  (Hirsch  2005,  71).  Note,  though,  that  making  a  conceptual  mistake  does  not
amount to making an a priori mistake on Ball’s picture. For, according to his view, a term can
have a certain meaning in  virtue of  a  (e.g.  future)  stipulation which  the  speaker  is  in  no
position to know of (cf. 2020, 48-9).
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vince proponents like Paul (P) of their view, and (ii) proponents convince oppon-
ents.
1. If O convinces P – so that O and P end up agreeing that same-sex mar-
riage is by definition impossible – then the assertion of (1)  will seem to
have been a good argument: an argument that bears on the issue, and ex-
presses a reasonable belief. […]
2. If P convinces O – so that O and P end up agreeing that same-sex mar-
riage is possible – then the argument will seem flawed. (2020, 55)
On Ball’s account, if some day e.g. the opponents of same-sex marriage succeed,
then this retrospectively establishes that Olivia and Paul express the more narrow,
conservative concept of marriage when uttering “marriage” during their dispute.
Sentence (C) will thus come out as true and inconsistent with Paul’s assertion. (In
this first case, (1) “may end up as […] true”, too, as Ball (2020, 55) remarks.) In
the case of proponents succeeding, in contrast, Olivia and Paul are employing the
more liberal concept of marriage when speaking of “marriage” in their dispute. (1)
as well as (C) then end up being false. But both of Olivia’s assertions would still
be inconsistent with Paul’s, even in this  second case.  So,  in this  sense,  Olivia
would still make a  relevant contribution to the debate even if liberals like Paul
succeeded.  Ball’s  picture can therefore  easily  vindicate  the  appearance  of  dis-
agreement between the speakers. Whoever succeeds, the two parties intend to con-
vey conflicting beliefs about one and the same topic. 
This certainly is a virtue of Ball’s account. Yet even so, Ball’s picture is chal-
lenged by his own argument argument. On a closer look, his theory of retrospect-
ive meaning stipulation fails to explain how disputants respond to reasons in de-
bates like Olivia’s and Paul’s. Let us spell out this worry in more detail.
In typical cases of dispute, a speaker (or group of speakers) A wants to convince
another speaker (or group of speakers) B of a certain thesis (or group of theses) t,
which B assumes to be false. In the course of the debate, A comes up with reasons
for why B should take t to be true. (In the above case, for instance, Olivia’s asser-
tion of (1) is supposed to be a reason for Paul to start believing conclusion (C).) If
B finds A’s reasons convincing, then at least in an ideal world B changes his mind.
Moreover, B takes t to be true (and changes his mind) because he judges A’s reas-
ons to be convincing. That is, B starts accepting thesis t because B judges the reas-
ons provided by A during their dispute as being good reasons for believing in t.
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Now assume that, sadly, possibility 1 above is actualised. That is, opponents of
same-sex marriage like Olivia really convince proponents like Paul. The oppon-
ents’ analysis of “marriage” thus comes out ahead and the meaning of “marriage”
is retrospectively determined such that Olivia’s conclusion (C) is true. Hence, on
Ball’s view, it is already settled during Olivia’s and Paul’s dispute that Olivia’s as-
sertion of (1) really is a “good argument” (2020, 55) – a good reason for Paul and
others to be convinced of conclusion (C) – and that is a good thing.24 According to
Ball, however, it is a future fact that retrospectively determines whether (1)  is a
good argument: the fact that Paul and other proponents of same-sex marriage will
eventually be convinced by (1) and hence follow Olivia and the rest of the oppon-
ents to accept (C). So, on Ball’s account, (1) is a good reason to believe in (C) be-
cause Paul and others will eventually be convinced by it. Sentence (1) is a good
argument that “expresses a reasonable belief” (2020, 55) in virtue of the fact that
Olivia’s analysis of “marriage” is going to be accepted by proponents like Paul.
This, however, seems to turn things on its head. And it seems to misconstrue how
we take ourselves and others to be responding to reasons in such debates. Why?
As I see it, we would certainly insist that the reason why we change our minds
about something is that the person we are arguing with provided good reasons to
do so – reasons we rationally responded to. Proponents like Paul, for instance,
would certainly insist that the reason why they became convinced of (C) is that
the opponents’ assertions of (1) and other arguments they gave provided good
reasons to believe in (C). They would take themselves as eventually accepting the
opponents’ analysis of “marriage” because they came to find the opponents’ argu-
ments convincingly good arguments – better arguments than their own. But they
would certainly resist the idea that (1) and other arguments provided good reasons
to believe in (C) in virtue of the fact that proponents like themselves will be even-
tually convinced by them. 
Intuitively, what makes arguments like (1) good and convincing should not hinge
on whether they will eventually be accepted as good or not. What makes Olivia’s
statement a good argument and a true sentence in the setting detailed should not
be the fact that Paul will eventually subscribe to it. The latter, however, seems ex-
actly how Ball construes the situation. According to his account, Olivia’s assertion
of (1) provides a reasonable argument for Paul because her analysis of “marriage”
is going to be accepted by proponents like Paul at some point in the future. (For
24 In contrast,  if  the proponents’ analysis succeeds,  then Olivia’s assertions would simply be
false; her argument would thus be “flawed” (2020, 55).
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only in this case is what Olivia says retrospectively settled as true.) On Ball’s pic-
ture, Olivia provided a good argument because proponents like Paul will be con-
vinced by it. Yet this, of course, is not how we usually see ourselves responding to
reasons in such debates. When involved in ameliorative disputes, we see ourselves
responding to  reasons that  are  good and convincing independently of  whether
somebody (ourselves included) will eventually acknowledge them as such. 
A closer look at how Ball explains the way pre- and post-ameliorators argue there-
fore reveals that his argument argument seems to challenge his very own account.
At least at first glance, his account cannot accommodate the way disputants re-
spond to reasons. The metalinguistic account, in contrast, can do so.25
As a result, Ball’s view is far from being established as “superior” to the naive
picture of conceptual engineering. As we have seen in the last section, “going
meta”  in  our  interpretation  of  debates  between pre-  and post-ameliorators  can
counter Ball’s argument argument. The naive view can easily explain the way we
argue.  Pace  Ball, his account is therefore not inevitable. Ball simply dismisses
“going meta” without argument. As conceded in this section, this does not mean
that the metalinguistic picture is without problems. In fact, on a classic Gricean
picture, the account needs to construe some speakers as erring about their own
communicative intentions. Compared to the alternative Ball (2020) provides, how-
ever, this price seems well worth paying. For not only does his account subscribe
considerable  errors  to  speakers,  too.  In  contrast  to  the  metalinguistic  subject-
change view, Ball’s idea of revisionary analysis is also questioned by his own ar-
gument argument. 
VI. Conclusion
This paper has critically discussed two recent contenders to the naive view of con-
ceptual engineering: Sawyer’s dual-aspect theory of representation and Ball’s idea
of revisionary analyses. According to both theorists, “conceptual engineering” is a
bit like the term “red panda”. According to Sawyer, there is some engineering go-
25 This is not meant to suggest that Ball could not come up with a reply to the challenge outlined.
For example, Ball could insist that what might make (1) a good reason to believe in (C) in the
situation outlined is eventually not just  the fact  that  proponents  will  be convinced by (1).
Instead, Ball might e.g. argue that proponents will eventually accept (C) as true (and take (1)
to be convincing) because a) there is only one maximally joint-carving concept of marriage, b)
this concept is such that it excludes same-sex marriage and c) in the long run, speakers’ beliefs
come to mirror the fundamental structure of the world. (Thanks to Delia Belleri for pointing
this out.) Note, however, that such a solution would bring in heavy theoretical machinery and
controversial commitments into Ball’s account – commitments that could easily be avoided by
“going meta”.
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ing on in conceptual engineering yet no engineering of  concepts. According to
Ball, on the other hand, there are concepts involved but no real  engineering of
them. As a result, both accounts reject the tight connection between conceptual
engineering and conceptual pluralism outlined in section 1: according to Sawyer
as well as Ball, projects of conceptual engineering do not lead to situations of sev-
eral competing concepts within a single linguistic community. 
As this paper has shown, however, their two accounts are in fact built on a rejec-
tion of the metalinguistic picture and an assessment of disputes and topics which
could not hold up against scrutiny. Sawyer and Ball take their own views to be re-
quired to sufficiently accommodate our impression of disagreement between pre-
and post-ameliorators. It is alleged that we must subscribe to these accounts to ex-
plain  the  way we argue.  As  demonstrated,  however,  both  of  their  unorthodox
views can in fact be avoided when sticking to the naive picture. 
As we have seen in section 2, Sawyer’s dual-aspect theory postulates a further
representational  element  in  addition  to  meanings:  concepts.  Sawyer  takes  this
move to be necessary for explaining doxastic disagreement and topic continuity in
cases of meaning change. Yet, as section 3 laid out, the naive picture can incorpor-
ate such cases. Furthermore, even within Sawyer’s theory – i.e. even if there were
a  distinction  between  concepts  and  meanings  –  concept  continuity  would  be
neither necessary nor sufficient for securing topic continuity over time. This cer-
tainly does not vindicate the metalinguistic picture either.  But it  might still  be
enough to shift the burden of proof back on Sawyer’s unorthodox and less parsi-
monious account.
Ball’s idea of revisionary analysis faces similar problems. As demonstrated in sec-
tion 4, his account, too, is not inevitable. Cases of argumentative dispute between
pre- and post-ameliorators can be explained by the so-called subject-change view.
Yes, sometimes this view might have to attribute considerable errors to speakers.
But, as section 5 laid out, the same holds for Ball’s view. Additionally – and in
contrast to the metalinguistic view – Ball’s picture seems to run into trouble when
explaining the disputants’ way of responding to arguments.
Summing up, this paper has come up with reasons to consider the naive picture of
conceptual engineering a serious contender to two of its most recent rivals. As
long as there is no good reason to stop being naive, we might thus stick to the idea
of conceptual engineers as engineering concepts for a little while longer.
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